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Gorringe, H; Stott, C & Rosie, M 2012. ‘Dialogue Police, Decision Making, and the 
Management of Public Order During Protest Crowd Events’, Journal of Investigative 
Psychology and Offender Profiling 9(2): pp111–125 
 
Following unprecedented challenges to public order policing in the UK, Her Majesty's 
Chief Inspector of Constabulary conducted a detailed review of public order policing which 
emphasised the need to facilitate peaceful protest. The Association of Chief Police Officers 
revised its guidance manual accordingly to emphasise ‘policing by consent’, ‘engagement 
and dialogue’. These guidelines, however, fit imperfectly with established practice and so 
police forces across the UK are revisiting understandings of crowd behaviour and public 
order tactics. The 2011 Liberal Democrat Spring conference in Sheffield, therefore, was 
both an interesting event in itself, and a critical test case for dialogue-based policing in the 
UK. This paper draws on empirical data to analyse the case study and tease out the lessons 
to be learned from what proved to be a successful policing operation. 
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Introduction 
Under intense political and media scrutiny following a death during London’s 2009 G20 
summit protests (Rosie & Gorringe 2009); facing legal challenges after the Kingsnorth 
Climate Camp and the G20 (Bindmans 2011); coming to terms with the domestication of 
the European Convention of Human Rights; and challenged to facilitate peaceful protest by 
Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCIC, 2009a and b); police forces across 
the UK are having to revisit accepted understandings of crowd behaviour and public order 
tactics. As the revised Association of Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO) guidance manual – 
Keeping the Peace – puts it:  ‘the world of protest has changed and public order and 
practice must change with it’ (ACPO 2010: 7). At the heart of the revised guidance is the 
emphasis on ‘policing by consent’ and the assertion that ‘engagement and dialogue should 
be used, whenever possible, to demonstrate a “no surprises” approach’ (ibid. 11). 
 
Against this backdrop the Liberal Democrats hosted their 2011 Spring Conference in 
Sheffield, home to party leader Nick Clegg’s constituency. Public sector cuts and reneging 
on a pledge to oppose student tuition fees meant that the conference became a focal point 
for dissent against the Coalition government. Given rumours of mass protests and with the 
presence of protected persons at the event, a zero-tolerance police approach might have 
been expected. Indeed, much media coverage and activist ire focused on an expensive and 
symbolically powerful fence surrounding the conference venue. Activists saw the barriers 
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as an over-reaction which signalled that demonstrators would be ‘kettled’; a concern partly 
fuelled by the student protests in London in December 2010. When demonstrators from 
that march occupied Conservative Party headquarters, the policing response became more 
robust and containment tactics were prominently deployed. Sheffield’s fence led onlookers 
to assume that the policing of the LibDem conference would see more of the same. From 
the outset, however, the police commander determined that the defining motif of policing 
in Sheffield would be facilitation, dialogue and liaison. 
 
Sheffield’s LibDem Conference, therefore, was not only an interesting event in its own 
right, but a critical test case for dialogue-based policing in the UK. This paper draws on 
empirical data to offer an analysis of the case study and tease out the lessons to be learned 
from what proved to be a successful policing operation. We begin by charting recent 
developments in UK public order policing, then briefly review the literature on protest 
policing and dialogue models to place the data on Operation Obelisk (the police codename 
for this event), within a wider frame of reference.  
 
Public Order Challenges & Dialogue Policing  
One might assume that the new ACPO guidelines would echo current police practice since 
UK policing has always emphasised policing by consent in contrast to more militarised 
styles elsewhere in Europe (Della Porta and Fillieule 2004). Indeed, forces in Scotland have 
been quick to assert that the ‘new’ ACPO guidelines simply echo what they already do 
(Rosie & Gorringe 2011). Over recent decades there has also been a shift away from police 
responses based on escalated force to an emphasis on negotiated management and dialogue 
(Waddington 2007). As Hoggett and Stott’s (2010) study of public order training shows, 
however, existing tactics in practice tend to revolve around arrest, containment and 
dispersal and are ill-equipped to deal with a new emphasis on dialogue and facilitation.  
 
The HMCIC reports emphasised the limitations of existing tactics and models by 
highlighting the work of Sweden’s dialogue police. Since 2009, thus, UK forces have 
sought to innovate tactically and experiment with communicative approaches to protest 
policing (Gorringe et al. 2011; Thames Valley Police 2010). Commanders, however, have 
been hamstrung by the lack of operational exemplars from within the UK (Gorringe et al. 
2011). In the absence of proven models, commanders may doubt the efficacy of liaison-
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based tactics and rely on existing practice. It is in this context that Operation Obelisk 
assumes significance.  
 
In recognising the capacity for police action to incite a crowd and turning away from 
discredited understandings of crowd behaviour the O’Connor reports (HMCIC, 2009a & b) 
drew upon two areas of research; the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM), which 
offers a theoretical basis for understanding crowd dynamics (Reicher et al. 2004; Stott et al. 
2008), and studies of Scandinavian ‘dialogue policing’ (Holgersson and Knutsson 2010; 
Wahlstrom 2007). Both areas of work emphasise the need for flexible, reflexive and pre-
emptive and/or preventative public order management. 
 
The ESIM delineates the social and psychological processes through which certain tactics 
can unify a crowd in opposition to police and contribute to an escalation of conflict 
(Reicher, 1996; Stott and Reicher, 1998). Reicher et al. (2004; 2007) and Stott et al. (2008) 
outline several principles for effective public order policing: education, facilitation, 
communication and differentiation. Only by learning to appreciate the values, beliefs and 
objectives of protest groups can police avoid antagonism and facilitate the lawful 
objectives of crowd participants. Crucially, the ESIM stresses the need for ongoing 
attempts to meet the legitimate aims of crowd members even when there are signs of 
‘trouble’, and insists that communication should not be neglected during crowd events, 
especially in situations of emerging tension (Reicher et al., 2004: 568).  
 
There is a clear resonance between ESIM and the ‘dialogue policing’ now routinely 
adopted in Sweden. Indeed, the head of the Stockholm dialogue unit describes the ESIM as 
its theoretical rationale (Osterling 2011; cf Holggerson and Knuttson, 2010). In 2001’s 
Gothenburg protests three demonstrators were shot and a further 150 injured in what was 
widely seen as a ‘disaster’ for Swedish police. In response, Sweden’s National Police 
Board introduced the Special Police Tactic, a new system of crowd management using 
‘Dialogue Officers’ tasked with contact and negotiation with dissident groups. The 
intention is to ‘facilitate expressions of freedom of speech and the right to demonstrate’, 
minimising confrontation, injury and destruction of property (Holgersson and Knuttson 
2010: 15). The five essential components of dialogue policing are: Negotiation; Mediation; 
Initiation (suggesting possible solutions to problems); Communication; and Sensing (taking 
the ‘temperature’ of the crowd). Dialogue officers establish ‘long term, mutually trusting 
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and respectful’ relationships with protestors (Wahlstrom 2007: 397). They represent 
protestors’ demands and concerns in meetings and aim to secure compromises and 
solutions that will satisfy all parties and minimise antagonism (Osterling 2011; Wahlstrom 
2007). During protest events, dialogue officers try to uphold prior agreements, sustain 
communication between demonstrators and police, de-escalate potential conflicts, and 
report the changing moods of the crowd to police commanders.    
 
Alvèn (2010) emphasises the importance of transparency and predictability in dealings with 
protest groups. This tallies with Wahlstrom and Oskarsson’s (2006:121) research on the 
importance of trust. They emphasise three key aspects: ‘(1) reputation: what is known of 
an actor’s past actions; (2) performance: the present actions and results of the actor; and (3) 
appearance: the actor’s presentation of their own trustworthiness.’ In other words, the 
success of dialogue units depends not just on what they do, but on what they are seen to do 
and how this is interpreted within the crowd. Wahlstrom (2007), however, reserves 
judgement on the approach. Firstly, he notes tension between instrumental police objectives 
and the rhetoric of dialogue. Echoing Waddington’s (1994) scepticism about negotiated 
management, Wahlstrom is unsure whether dialogue policing will result in ‘genuinely more 
democratic forms of protest policing, or merely lead to nothing but more subtle forms of 
coercion’ (2007: 400). 
 
Secondly, as UK forces are discovering, moves towards dialogue are difficult in practice. 
Dialogue officers may be regarded as ‘traitors’ by colleagues (Holgersson and Knuttson, 
2010) and as ‘devious intelligence gatherers’ by protesters (Gorringe et al. 2011). 
Wahlstrom (2007: 397) found that many commanders distrusted the tactic and resented 
having to engage with protesters with no desire to reciprocate, especially as the results of 
dialogue are not always immediately apparent. Holgersson and Knutsson (2010), however, 
insist that such internal opposition has eroded as the Swedish dialogue approach has 
resulted in less frequent and less severe instances of disorder.  
 
This confidence in the methods and tactics of dialogue is currently absent in the UK. The 
shift in UK policing priorities has been sudden and largely unanticipated. Deaths at British 
protest events are rare (Rosie and Gorringe 2009), and public order policing has been 
overtaken by events. From both academic and policy-oriented perspectives, therefore, the 
need for empirically grounded and theoretically informed research is pressing.  McSeveny 
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and Waddington’s (2011) chapter on Operation Obelisk highlights the significance of 
South Yorkshire Police’s use of social media and deployment of liaison officers. They 
argue that ‘such officers are capable of correcting dangerously refracted perceptions and 
improving the effectiveness and perceived legitimacy of tactical incursions’ (ibid. 211). 
Their research confirms the significance of current innovations in policing and opens up an 
interesting debate about the efficacy of dialogue-style policing to which this paper 
contributes. 
 
Methods and Event 
The following account of Operation Obelisk is based on an ethnographic approach in which 
the authors observed events on all three days of the conference either on the ground or in 
the police control room. Significantly, one of the authors served as a consultant during the 
planning phases of the operation and was able to engage in and document planning 
meetings. This allows us to chart how the concept of liaison evolved over the operation. 
We had unique access to planning meetings prior to the Conference, the police control 
room and key officers during it, and to commanders for post-event de-briefing sessions. 
Such access raises questions about objectivity. We should note that Stott was appointed as 
an academic expert and accepted the consultancy on the basis that he could use his 
observations for research purposes. All three authors have worked with different police 
forces and observed multiple events and were able to bring a critical comparative analysis 
to bear here. Finally, McSeveny and Waddington (2011) offer a broadly similar 
interpretation of some key incidents which affords us greater confidence in our analysis. 
 
We adopted an ‘observer-as-participant’ role and mingled with protestors, capturing their 
experience of policing and interactions with the liaison team, and conducting ‘in-situ’ 
interviews. We noted salient points and events and held multiple conversations with police 
and protestors across all three days, interrogating motivations and rationales for behaviour. 
Following the events we reviewed newspaper and web coverage and were provided access 
to a police summary of social media surrounding the event (Newby 2011). We 
subsequently discussed events with operational officers and commanders both in a post-
event briefing and during seven in-depth interviews with leading officers the week after. 
Notes and interviews were recorded and/or written up as soon as possible and circulated 
amongst the authors. Whilst participant observation is necessarily partial, our ability to 
gather data independently but then triangulate notes affords us confidence that our data 
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reflect the behavioural patterns of the events in general and enable us to delineate the key 
underlying processes.  
 
The Liberal Democrat conference occurred over three days: Friday 11
th
 to Sunday 13
th
 
March 2011. The Friday saw a relatively small protest as delegates arrived. This allowed 
the liaison officers time to introduce themselves, make contact with some of the protest 
constituents, and sense the moods of the crowd. There were two main incidents that first 
evening. The first involved a conference delegate, Patrick Streeter, addressing and being 
confronted by the protestors. The second was the dwindling crowd’s eventual decision to 
leave the designated protest site and cluster around the venue entrance. The main 
demonstrations were planned for Saturday when protestors gathered in a small park called 
Devonshire Green before moving along a pre-planned route to the conference venue. The 
key points were the rally at Devonshire Green, the march itself, and the demonstration 
outside the conference. On Sunday a protest was planned to coincide with the conclusion of 
the conference. Liaison officers were deployed on the ground and in the crowd on each of 
these days. 
 
Planning 
Martin Scothern – the Event Silver - noted how protestors ‘framed’ the conference by 
reference to student demonstrations in London, as refracted through both media and the 
experiences of local students. Whilst police in Sheffield had assiduously built rapport with 
student leaders during local demonstrations in December 2010, Scothern observed,  when 
‘we came back to them again … their attitude towards me was different … So, that’s what 
started me thinking about how do we manage this relationship better’.1  
 
Moreover, whilst Scothern accepted the recommendations of the HMIC reports regarding 
dialogue and liaison he felt there was no clarification for how to actually deploy their 
suggested ‘protest liaison officers’. As noted, therefore, one of the authors was brought in 
as a consultant to help define the strategy, tactical approach and role of a specifically 
created Police Liaison Team (PLT). As Scothern told us: 
 
I felt that we needed to nail down what we meant by protest liaison, to define it.  
And that was the bit for me that’s probably, at strategic level, the most significant. 
                                                 
1 Unless stated otherwise, all quotes are taken from the interviews detailed at the end of the paper. 
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… I am fairly confident that if I pick the right players … that they deliver the 
products on the ground.  But that doesn’t work unless you actually define it and 
explain what it is. 
 
The planning phase, thus, focused on establishing a trusted team of liaison officers (“the 
right players”), on ensuring that they were fully aware of their responsibilities and had a 
properly defined role. This is significant given Wahlstrom’s (2007) finding that many 
officers pre-judge protests as either good or bad and dislike the uncertainty introduced by 
dialogue.  Of equal concern was the question of ‘how does the protest liaison strategy fit 
with the old world strategy?’ (ibid.) One key challenge was to conceptualise how the PLTs 
would work not only in relation to the crowd but also to more familiar modes of public 
order policing:  arrest, dispersal and containment. 
 
Once the command team had been selected the key strategic priorities were finalised. Of 
particular importance was that the PLTs would be the operational basis for promoting 
‘effective communication’ and ‘relationships’ between police and protestors. In addition, 
PLTs would enable ‘dynamic risk assessment ... to influence police tactics’. This aimed ‘to 
create ... a graded tactical profile capable of avoiding the undifferentiated use of force’; 
thus ‘maximising perceptions of the crowds’ view of the legitimacy of police action’ 
(Planning Meeting notes).  
 
The deployment of PLTs aimed to achieve police legitimacy and proportionality in any 
intervention. Rather than controlling protestors, the primary aim was to communicate, 
understand and differentiate between them, better inform police responses and improve the 
flow of information. Significantly, it was agreed that Liaison would be the primary tactic. 
Given the experience of liaison teams elsewhere (Gorringe et al. 2011), these steps were of 
fundamental importance.  
 
There was also considerable debate in the planning phase concerning the skill sets required 
by the PLTs. The two officers given the responsibility for developing the PLTs were 
qualified as both negotiators and trained public order commanders. This meant that they 
had a feel for the dialogue-based aspects of the role whilst retaining the trust of public 
order colleagues (cf. Wahlstrom 2007). Moreover, whilst PLT officers were recruited from 
various backgrounds – three were detectives – they shared proven “communication” and 
“street skills”. Indeed, according to one of the commanders:  
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... being public order trained, can actually hold you back… It’s a … cultural shift to 
go from being stood there with a baton or a shield, to actually talking to some 
people that you probably, in reality, some of the staff wouldn’t have had any 
common ground with. (Barber) 
 
Some of those recruited were initially sceptical. Barber noted how some ‘thought it was 
going to be a bit soft and fluffy and a bit pink.  But actually, [they] could see the benefits.  
So actually, I think we have converted some of them’.  
 
Several police respondents also felt that their background as negotiators brought 
competencies that proved particularly useful preceding the event, not least building 
relationships with protest groups. Perhaps of greater significance were the protocols 
governing how the PLTs were tied into the command structure which reflected those 
generally adopted by negotiating teams. Specifically, during the event, the PLTs were kept 
separate - or ‘sterile’ - from the operational command radio channels so that they would be 
unaware of other police deployments. Moreover, they were required to communicate 
through ‘PLT Silver’ (Superintendent Barber) located in Command and Control alongside 
the Event Silver. The PLT Silver was then required to write regular reports from the PLTs 
for Silver.  
 
Gateways to Trust 
Key officers had read up on the theory and practice of liaison, but this knowledge was yet 
to be tested in practice and so suspicions remained. As Green, PLT Bronze, reflected: ‘it is 
an easy thing to read, isn’t it, an academic paper that says crowds will self police’. 
Moreover, there were uncertainties about how to engage with more radical groups. The 
PLTs made extensive efforts to contact protest groups ahead of events, but as Barber 
pointed out, there were only “about 5 real groups that we had managed to make contact 
with” and “we were never going to [manage to] involve the more radical protestors”. 
 
Liaison officers, thus, remained somewhat ambivalent and apprehensive about their role. 
From this perspective they were fortunate on the first evening. Events began late afternoon 
on Friday 11
th
 with a ‘school walkout’ and other protests, but by around four o’clock fewer 
than one hundred protestors were in the city centre. Nonetheless, Police Liaison Officers 
(PLOs) attired in normal uniforms with pale blue vests marked ‘Liaison Officer’, chatted to 
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protestors, handing out information leaflets, and making themselves visible and available. 
PLOs engaged people by explaining the primary objectives of the police operation and of 
their specific role.  
 
The PLOs saw immediate benefits to their deployment. As noted above, despite multiple 
efforts, the more radicalised groups had resisted attempts to communicate with them in 
advance. But during the first protest a leading figure from one such group set up a table to 
distribute leaflets, enabling the PLTs to start establishing a relationship. It was here that 
their negotiation skills proved valuable.  
 
We had tried to make contact. Yeah, we tried a number of ways, we left a number of 
voicemails.  So actually, when I first went over to speak to him, I introduced myself, 
and said: ‘we were trying to get hold of you yesterday’.  What about?  And then, 
said, look, that’s what we are here for.   
 
Interviewer:  So this was your first concrete opportunity to start actually talking? 
 
And actually, one of the things that we had said, someone had said to you when we 
were debating in that planning phase was, I think any cops can go and talk to all 
these people.  Those that are perhaps harder to engage, don’t really want to, that is 
when you should be using people with specific skills. (Green)   
 
A second break-through came when protestors, by now numbering several hundred, moved 
towards Barkers Pool abutting the City Hall conference venue. At one end of the street the 
crowd was confronted by a steel fence, at the other they found a set of temporary gates. The 
immediate impression among demonstrators was that these gates would allow the police to 
‘kettle’ them. This information was fed back to Silver: 
 
And Scott’s first request through me was to ask Martin [Scothern] about 
consideration to actually remove [the gates].  So, Martin and I had a conversation 
and I think Martin’s compromise was appropriate: ‘I am not taking them away 
because they are a safety feature, however, as a compromise to the groups, we will 
involve their stewards if we need to close those gates’.  So that was then fed back to 
Scott [Green], to say can you speak to them and see how acceptable that was. 
(Barber). 
 
With intelligence of large crowds in the centre of Sheffield, and against the context of the 
Hillsborough disaster, the police saw the gates as a safety mechanism to be closed - if 
necessary - to prevent crushing. So focused were they on such concerns, according to 
Scothern that: ‘We never saw that, that they would interpret those gates as being a means 
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to contain.  We never thought about that in a million years.  But we got that back from the 
PLT’. As Scothern reflected, the PLTs early operational value was that they were able to 
feed back accurately on what protestors were thinking. This information allowed him to 
offset perceptions of police illegitimacy by asking the organising groups to manage the 
gates themselves. Three key things were accomplished here: PLOs gained a sense of what 
they could achieve, the senior commander’s theoretical attachment to the model was given 
substance, and the crowd started to interact with the PLOs.  
 
Shortly afterwards, Patrick Streeter, a Liberal Democrat conference delegate made his way 
into the crowd and attempted to address it. His presence provoked an angry response from 
sections of the crowd prompting a PLT to make its way through the protestors. 
Significantly, they stood in the vicinity but did not intervene. After quickly assessing the 
situation the PLT Bronze contacted Silver and requested him ‘not to do anything’. This 
PLT response was framed by the understanding developed through their earlier interactions 
with the crowd concerning perceptions of police illegitimacy: 
 
There were a number of people, particularly senior members of Sheffield Anti Cuts 
Alliance who said ‘this fence should not be here, we should be allowed to go in 
there and protest’.  So there is already a question about legitimacy, the police 
putting this big fence up.  And then, well, if you then try to send these people [public 
order officers] in to see what is happening over there, there are further questions 
about [legitimacy]. (Green) 
 
Green’s invocation not to ‘do anything’, led us to ask the Public Order Bronze commander 
what might have happened without the PLTs. He confirmed that ‘I would have deployed 
somebody to get [Streeter] out’ (Mutch). All respondents recognised the potentially 
negative impact of such an intervention for the perceived legitimacy of the police and the 
efficacy of the PLTs. The question of what to do with Streeter remained. Green describes 
how the PLOs moved close ‘in case he needed to be got out of there’, but then stood by and 
watched ‘almost as invisible observers’. He described how Streeter was initially heckled 
before other crowd members insisted he should be allowed to speak. At this point Green 
felt that the theoretical papers on crowd dynamics made sense. ‘Actually’, he noted, ‘that is 
the first time I have stood in a crowd and watched that self-policing take place’.  
 
PLT respondents spoke of how these incidents demonstrated to them that their earlier 
engagements had been worthwhile because they had apparently been ‘accepted by the 
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crowd’ and were able to move through it without hindrance. As Green reflected “that was 
sort of, the first time I thought, well we are actually doing now, what we said we would.  
We are in the crowd, we are listening to them, we are getting a sense of how they feel.  We 
are interpreting what impact the police actions are having on the crowd”.  Moreover, the 
self-regulation of the crowd was understood by the police as a direct outcome of the PLTs 
and the resultant lack of alternate intervention.  
 
The final event on Friday occurred when the crowd spontaneously made their way round to 
the delegate’s entrance. As the Public Order Bronze noted, ‘There was intelligence to say 
that they were going to blockade the delegate’s entrance, you know, and I thought that was 
realistic’ (Mutch). Given this, the move could have been interpreted as a dangerous 
escalation. As the protestors regrouped some delegates faced verbal harassment from the 
crowd. Consequently public order units were deployed to the entrance and created a cordon 
to protect delegates.   
 
The PLTs had followed the crowd and according to Green now experienced a near 
epiphany: 
 
All the things that I have experienced in my career came to fruition then … So we, 
initially, we ended up stood with this line of police officers in yellow, facing the 
crowd.  And I don’t know how long we were stood there for, by my guess it would 
be 15 – 20 seconds.  And almost immediately all of us thought; ‘no, this isn’t where 
we should be, we should be stood in there’.  So as I stepped forward to say to my 
team, we need to be in the crowd facing back that way, they were all doing it at 
exactly the same time.  And for me, that was so significant, it was self-evident that 
all of my team understood what their role was, including me at that point.  And that 
the crowd did as well.  And that, for me, was the moment where I suddenly thought, 
I know exactly what we are to do now. (Green)   
 
The apparent legitimacy and acceptance of the PLTs was vividly illustrated by a decision to 
move the protest group slightly back from the conference entrance to facilitate access. The 
PLTs moved through the crowd explaining this so that when the Public Order Bronze asked 
the crowd to move back and his yellow jacketed officers stepped forward there were ‘no 
surprises’. More significantly, a handful who objected were urged to pull back by radical 
activists in the crowd who had been engaged earlier by the PLTs (Fieldnotes). Over the 
course of the first evening, thus, the PLTs came to believe in the tactic and realise both how 
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it should work and that it did work. Furthermore, they began forging a reputation with both 
crowd and police colleagues. 
Flare Ups  
On Saturday morning a much larger and more diverse demonstration congregated on 
Devonshire Green. PLOs were much in evidence – mingling within the crowd of 
approximately four thousand, handing out leaflets and chatting to people about their role, 
the march and the weather. There were few other officers in evidence: operational 
commanders had noted continuing rumours about kettling and many units had instructions 
not to leave their vans (Leake).. Indeed, the Public Order Bronze explained that his key 
concern ‘was hiding staff to allay the fears of people’. Thus it was that when Patrick 
Streeter (‘don’t you just love him?’, one respondent said) re-appeared, trying to seize a 
microphone and provoking hostility, the PLTs were immediately to hand. They swiftly lead 
the delegate away, urging the protestors surging around Streeter to return to the Green. 
Notably, they calmed protestors by urging them not to ‘give him the publicity’ rather than 
by ordering them back (Fieldnotes). 
 
It is worth recalling that ‘every time … more than two or three police officers came near 
them, they were, “oh that’s it, we are going to get kettled then are we?  Are you preparing 
to kettle us?”’ (Leake). The ability to extract Streeter without fuss was significant. The 
enhanced legitimacy of the PLTs was emphasised just before the march when the chief 
steward rallied protestors before closing with two key points. The first was to reassure the 
crowd about the gates in Barkers Pool. He stressed that he had been concerned by them, but 
had agreed that they would be manned by stewards not police and only closed in the event 
of over-crowding. Finally he encouraged members of the crowd who had any questions to 
approach a steward or ‘one of the blue vested liaison officers’. A solitary and somewhat 
ironic ‘boo’ rang out from the crowd which was met by widespread laughter.  
 
Legitimacy, however, was not a given; it needed to be constantly reinforced. Indeed, as the 
march reached the conference venue, a protestor approached the PLT Bronze who was 
taking a photo: 
 
As I took it, a … protestor said to me: ‘what are you doing that for, you are an 
intelligence team aren’t you’?  So I said ‘no, we’re not, we are a liaison team; this 
is what we do’. And I said, actually, I’m taking it for Twitter, and he didn’t believe 
me. So I said, ‘come here, I’ll show you’ [and] Tweeted it in front of him. And he 
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said; ‘I can’t believe it. I can’t believe that that is what you are here for’. Then I 
went through the role of the liaison team with him. About 10 minutes later, he sent 
out a Tweet, which was really positive … to say ‘this is how policing protest should 
be’. (Green) 
 
Central to the emphasis on facilitation was communication. Alongside liaison, SYP had a 
social media strategy to inform and engage both protestors and the wider public (cf. 
McSeveny and Waddington 2011). SYP’s Facebook and Twitter pages were inundated 
with messages of surprise, thanks and support for the ‘helpful’, ‘friendly’ and ‘positive’ 
policing (Newby 2011). As McSeveny and Waddington (2011: 209) found, however, the 
response was not uniformly encouraging. On Sheffield Indymedia, we found one exchange 
illustrating the potential pitfalls of social media. SYP posted a reassurance that the crowd 
would not be ‘kettled’, adding ‘this is not a recognised method of crowd control by South 
Yorkshire Police’. A critic immediately contradicted this claim with a (faulty) link to an 
article purporting to show that ‘SYP does use kettling’. Inspector Jayne Forest answered 
back re-iterating the original point whereupon the critic posted the working link urging 
SYP to ‘stop this deliberate deception’. SYP made no response (Indymedia 2011). This 
non-response illustrated the limitations of such an approach. Overall, though, this exchange 
captures SYP’s innovative attempts to reach out to more radical groups, personalise their 
communications strategy and enter into dialogue with those who would not normally talk to 
the police. 
 
The PLTs and social media team, thus, were communicating police intentions and actions 
to the crowd. This much was anticipated in advance. As Green put it: ‘I made the 
assumption that one of our key roles would be to interpret for the crowd, what the police 
were doing’ (Green). As the PLTs settled into the crowd, however, they began to pick up 
on rumours, fears and emotions and feed them back to commanders. Green concluded that 
ultimately, ‘I think we interpreted to the police what the crowd were doing, rather than the 
other way round’.  
 
One concrete example came when police numbers were doubled around the City Hall in 
anticipation of a shift-change. There was palpable unease with some protestors chanting 
‘Police state!’ (Fieldnotes) The Public Order Commander at the time sensed ‘something, 
but I couldn’t put my finger on it’. The PLOs had a clearer grasp: ‘phew, the tension went 
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right up then because they thought you were going to do something’ (Green). Inspector 
Mutch was simply ‘sending officers for their tea’ and conceded that there was ‘just a total 
lack of understanding on our part of how that crowd thinks about what’s going on … it was 
a big wake up for me that’ (Mutch).  
 
As Green noted: ‘We are in the crowd, we are listening to them, we are getting a sense of 
how they feel.  We are interpreting what impact the police actions are having’. PLTs, thus, 
were providing real-time information about crowd dynamics that, Barber argued, ‘you 
wouldn’t have got’ otherwise. Following this, future shift-changes were carefully 
choreographed and communicated in advance, meaning that the next change was met with 
amused cries of ‘Doughnut break!’ (Fieldnotes).  
 
The success of the PLTs here appears to have rested on their position within the crowd, but 
their location is a point of contention for two reasons: the safety of the officers concerned 
and their relations to crowd members. As regards safety, Green noted, the bottom-line ‘was 
for the bronze commander with the geographical responsibility for that area to say; I can’t 
get you out of there if something goes wrong’. With the good-natured crowd in Sheffield 
this hardly seemed like a priority, but as Silver put it: ‘The knockers would come in and 
say, yeah, of course it will work, you’ve got a negotiable crowd.  But it’s not until you get 
into Saturday, for me, that I start to see the real … argument for this kind of activity’ 
(Scothern). 
 
Scothern was referring to a point on Saturday when flares were set off in the midst of the 
dense crowd. One demonstrator with a flare jumped over a barricade at the top of Barkers 
Pool. He was immediately arrested, but despite some whistles, boos and chants there was 
no real sense of injustice, nor further attempt to breach police lines (Fieldnotes). The PLTs 
decided to deal with this on the ground and made their way through the crowd to talk to 
two young men dancing up and down with flares. As two liaison officers approached 
people surged forward to see what was happening and to photograph and video the police 
response. The officers swiftly defused a tricky situation by engaging in good-natured 
dialogue, pointing out the dangers of burning and that several people were already covered 
in ash (Fieldnotes).  
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Two of the authors were on the spot. From this perspective the PLOs appeared to have 
settled things and departed, but it later transpired that they had been ordered out due to 
concerns for their safety. According to Silver, ‘it’s horrendous on CCTV. It looks like the 
crowd are swarming around him’. Whilst Green ‘felt perfectly at ease in the crowd’ his 
focus on the incident meant that there was a delay in relaying that information back to 
Silver. There was a concern that the PLT Bronze may have been dragged out of role – or 
‘gone native’ - and not been fully alert to potential risks. Reflecting back on this, all the 
officers felt that there were lessons to be learned. Green reflected that perhaps he should 
have stayed back and let others deal with the flares whilst he maintained contact.  
 
The incident also highlights the dangers of relying on CCTV images in isolation. Operating 
within the crowd the PLTs offered a more ‘accurate’ ground-level and real-time analysis of 
risk and ensured that there would be no hasty reactions. The PLTs demonstrated the 
capacity for low-key dialogue and communication to defuse tense situations. Reminding 
flare-wielding young men of others around them in the crowd who might get hurt by their 
antics appears to have been effective, perhaps more so than a reprimand, caution or 
intervention by public order units would have been. 
 
Two further events underlined the benefits of liaison. Firstly, a group of UK Uncut activists 
broke away from the march and staged symbolic occupations of some high street shops. 
The police response was to deploy a temporary barrier between the shops and the protest 
crowd. This offered a powerful non-verbal signal of the limits to police toleration. 
Simultaneously, however, liaison officers interacted with the more radical activists and 
encouraged them back onto the demonstration.  
 
In this more heated atmosphere the PLOs were instrumental in preventing an escalation of 
police action as the protest wound down. Commanders were on edge due to intelligence of 
renewed UK Uncut actions. Of particular concern was a group dancing to an impromptu 
sound system in Barkers Pool. One young protestor began defacing a wall in clear view of 
cctv feeds to the Command centre. As Silver began to order his arrest the PLT Bronze 
shouted ‘it’s chalk, chalk’ into his radio (Fieldnotes). Being much closer to the scene, 
Green clarified that the graffiti was not being painted or sprayed on, but drawn with chalk. 
Subsequently, in a defining moment for the operation, the young ‘artist’ diligently wiped 
the chalk off the wall under the watchful eye of a female officer. Aggressive intervention at 
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any of the above points would doubtless have seen some within the crowd complain of 
‘political policing’. Instead the protest ended amicably with most people seeming to feel 
that their voices had been heard – notably, very few activists returned on the Sunday.  
 
Concluding Discussion 
The deployment of liaison officers is no isolated innovation, but part of a wider UK move 
towards proactive and dialogue-based policing consciously echoing the pioneering work of 
Swedish dialogue units. The aims and achievements of Operation Obelisk, thus, have wider 
relevance. Commanders elsewhere have been hindered by the fact that liaison methods 
were not yet ‘tried and trusted’ in a UK setting. The liaison strategy in Sheffield, thus, 
offers a template to be adopted and adapted. In the following analysis of events, thus, we 
think through lessons to be learned. 
 
The success of the PLT tactic in Sheffield, we contend, began long before the Conference. 
In the planning stage, the command team determined that liaison would be the primary 
tactic. Although SYP have no dedicated dialogue team extending beyond this operation, 
many of the issues encountered by Swedish dialogue officers were addressed. The 
operation team, thus, consulted relevant empirical and theoretical evidence, invited expert 
input and hand-picked officers capable of delivering proactive policing. Unlike innovations 
elsewhere (Gorringe et al. 2011), the PLTs were fully structured into the operation, 
integrated into key discussions and deployed in advance of the event.  
 
Whilst many of Sheffield’s PLOs were trained negotiators (unlike their Swedish 
counterparts; Alven 2010), most were also public-order trained and, thus, not pigeon-holed 
as ‘fluffy’. Their specific skill-sets were less important than the processes that characterise 
negotiation. Vitally the team followed a structure that placed a PLT coordinator in constant 
contact with the Event Silver. Early on they also echoed negotiators in using a ‘bunch of 
fives’ with protestors (providing five reasons why a certain action makes sense), and 
emphasising promised police actions (‘we said we would do this and we did’) and 
deliverables (‘we can do this for you’). 
 
In our view, commitment to liaison paid off on multiple counts. Firstly, PLTs offered high-
quality ground-level information that commanders could not have accessed by other means. 
Real-time contextualised knowledge enabled dynamic risk assessments about whether, 
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when and how to intervene proportionately. At key points PLT input gave commanders an 
accurate sense of moods within the crowd, allowing them to defuse tensions and engage 
radical activists. Whilst PLTs expected to communicate police actions to the crowd, their 
key contribution lay in their ability to mitigate the police tendency to intervene and to 
correct police assumptions and pre-conceptions. Far from the impression of PLTs as 
‘intelligence gatherers’, their capacity to ‘police the police’ and place decisions and 
possible actions in context helped to establish the legitimacy of police actions – and to limit 
police interventions - over the course of the weekend. This aspect of the role was not 
envisaged at the outset. 
 
Questions arise, of course, as to how this model would fare in the face of larger, more 
radical or more mobile protests. The Sheffield crowd (never more than 5,000) meant that 
the dozen officers deployed as PLOs remained visible and accessible throughout. Given the 
need to mingle with people and fears about the safety of the officers in the crowd could this 
tactic be used for mass marches? Evidence from Sweden suggests that it could (Holgersson 
and Knutsson 2010), though it is clearly no panacea (Wahlstrom 2007). Discussions around 
the flare suggest the need for a more formal structure of communication between PLOs, 
PLT Bronze and the command room - and protocols detailing how, when and which 
officers should intervene. Police-protestor interactions are likely to invite compaction as 
people surge round with cameras. To avoid a situation where CCTV is the only basis for 
monitoring this, it makes sense for a liaison officer tasked with communicating to the 
control room to stand off the interaction and offer a more detached view of proceedings.  
 
Our analysis also stresses that police legitimacy is not a given. It can be lost or created 
through dynamic interactions. Scothern noted how the policing of student protests in 
London affected how students in Sheffield viewed SYP. Equally, however, as Reicher et al. 
(2004: 561) argue, ‘groups have collective memories which can sometimes go back well 
beyond the experience or even the lifetime of any individual member’. Gorringe and Rosie 
(2008) similarly note how a local ‘history’ of police-protest interaction can shape future 
encounters. It is too early to tell what impact SYP’s experiment with liaison will have, but 
Theobald (2011) suggests that the emphasis on communication and proactive policing may 
partly explain why South Yorkshire escaped the riots that spread across other English cities 
in summer 2011. The social media engagement, pioneered above, was instrumental in 
reassuring and communicating with the public.  
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Equally significantly, Obelisk persuaded sceptical officers of the efficacy of dialogue. 
Given the largely consensual nature of the protests, the jury remains out on whether liaison 
can facilitate more democratic policing (Wahlstrom 2007), but the fact that UK Uncut 
protestors were ushered back onto the main march suggests that it may have begun to blur 
police binaries of between ‘legitimate and illegitimate’ protest. For many years academics 
and others – including HMIC (2009a, 2009b) - have looked to Swedish Dialogue units for 
inspiration on proactive, consensual policing. They still lead the field, but following 
McSeveny and Waddington’s (2011) work and our analysis of Operation Obelisk we 
contend that we now have a template for successful police liaison in the UK. 
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